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Introduction and summary
The past several decades have seen fundamental trans-
formations in the size, structure, and liquidity of world 
financial markets. Equity markets have fluctuated in 
value (currently about $17 trillion for U.S. equities) 
and have introduced new products such as exchange-
traded funds (mutual funds that trade like equities). 
Increasingly, structured equity products combine de-
rivatives and cash market positions to manage equity 
risks. Debt markets have grown rapidly (currently 
about $26 trillion for the U.S.1), with the greatest growth 
coming from mortgage- and asset-backed securitiza-
tions. Recently, credit derivatives (currently $26 trillion 
in notional value2) have begun to supplement and even, 
in some instances, replace cash markets in debt. De-
rivatives markets, of which over-the-counter (OTC) 
interest rate swaps are by far the largest component, 
have grown to $284 trillion in notional value.3 
These changes have facilitated economic growth. 
Where banks once held the loans and mortgages they 
originated, these are now routinely securitized and 
sold to domestic and foreign investors, thus increas-
ing the pool of capital that banks intermediate. The 
continuing exponential growth of derivatives markets; 
the development of new derivatives instruments; their 
impact on financial markets generally; the rapid trans-
formation of traditional institutional arrangements; 
and occasional operational, liquidity, and credit prob-
lems have all focused attention on what happens after 
the trade—the post-trade practices, structures, and ar-
rangements that ensure the smooth and efficient func-
tioning of these markets.4 
After a trade involving a financial instrument 
such as a derivatives contract is executed, it must be 
“cleared” and ultimately “settled.” These terms may 
have different meanings in the context of different 
market practices, which vary from country to country, 
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as well as from market to market. Nevertheless, clear-
ing typically involves post-trade operations, such as 
trade matching, confirmation, registration, as well as 
risk-management functions, such as netting, collater-
alization, and procedures (including “variation settle-
ment” or “variation margin”) that mitigate or eliminate 
some forms of credit risk. Settlement, by contrast, in-
volves the transfer of money or assets necessary for 
the counterparties to perform (and, in legal terms, 
“discharge”) their obligations.
Clearing and settlement systems are critical to 
the stability of the financial system, a system that is 
increasingly interconnected and global in scope. The 
significance of these systems, however, is at times in-
completely appreciated by observers. For example, 
these functions are sometimes referred to as mere 
“plumbing.” In a recent speech, President Michael 
Moskow of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 
took issue with this usage:5 
Post-trade clearing and settlement are some-
times referred to as the plumbing of the  
financial system. This term may suggest that 
clearing and settlement systems are of sec-
ondary importance. In fact, however, they are 
more like the central nervous system of the 
financial system. Clearing and settlement  
systems provide vital linkages among com-
ponents of the system, enabling them to 
work together smoothly. As such, clearing 
and settlement systems are critical for the 
performance of the economy.23 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
This article explores the functions performed by 
clearing and settlement institutions for financial markets, 
with a particular focus on derivatives, as opposed to 
securities, clearing and settlement. The nature of the 
counterparty credit risks that arise prior to settlement 
are essentially the same in both secondary securities 
markets and derivatives markets. The risk that either 
the buyer or seller of the security will be unable to per-
form its obligation (to pay for or deliver the security, 
respectively) is conceptually indistinguishable from 
the risk that the counterparties to a derivatives con-
tract will be able to perform their obligations as they 
fall due. 
However, securities transactions also involve func-
tions that have no analogues in derivatives markets. 
Securities, unlike derivatives, are financial assets. Se-
curities settlement, therefore, involves the transfer of 
the asset against the corresponding payment. This in-
volves the services of institutions, such as custodians, 
transfer agents, and others, which have no role in typ-
ical derivatives markets and necessitates risk-man-
agement procedures that are not typically present in 
derivatives markets. For example, risk-management 
operations for securities transactions and other linked 
payment transactions have been developed to ensure 
that both legs of the transaction (that is, the transfer 
of the asset and the corresponding payment) are com-
pleted or, if there is a failure, to ensure that neither leg 
is completed. The risk that one leg of the transaction 
may be completed but not the other is known as “set-
tlement risk.”6 The kinds of risk-management operations 
that have been developed to mitigate or eliminate this 
risk are typically called “delivery versus payment” 
(or DvP) or “payment versus payment” (or PvP).
Derivatives contracts are agreements to make pay-
ments or transact (buy/sell something) at some time 
in the future, ranging from a few days (for example, 
futures contracts nearing expiry) to many years (for 
example, long-dated interest rate swaps), based on the 
value of some underlying asset or index and, in the 
case of options, the decision of one of the counterpar-
ties. As a result, post-trade processing of derivatives 
can involve complexities that are typically missing 
from securities clearing and settlement. Box 1 lists 
many of the separate functions that may need to be 
performed over the life of a typical derivatives contract. 
In securities clearing and settlement, the length of 
time between the execution of a transaction (in which 
the counterparties undertake reciprocal obligations to 
deliver a security against payment) is dictated primarily 
by operational constraints. The parties do not bargain 
for deferred delivery and payment in a typical cash 
securities transaction—they seek the transfer of a par-
ticular quantity of securities in exchange for an agreed 
payment. The economic purpose of the transaction 
would be fulfilled if the transfer and payment took 
place immediately, without any delay. Time lags be-
tween the execution of a trade and settlement, whether 
that lag is one or three or five days in duration, result 
from the complex and interrelated operations neces-
sary to complete both legs of the transaction.
With derivatives, however, the length of time be-
tween the execution of a transaction and settlement is 
essential to the contract. Put another way, the funda-
mental economic purpose of a derivatives transaction 
involves the reciprocal obligations of the parties over 
the life of the contract. Of course, the creditworthi-
ness of the parties to a derivatives contract can fluctu-
ate in the interim. This is also true in securities 
transactions.7 However, unlike long-dated derivatives 
transactions, the obligations of the buyer and seller of 
a security are settled within a few days, typically no 
more than three or five days, depending upon the se-
curity and the market involved.
As a result, the parties to a derivatives contract 
are principally dependent upon each other’s creditwor-
thiness to assure future performance in the absence of 
mechanisms to transfer that risk. The combination of a 
much longer time horizon for completing transactions, 
greater uncertainty as to the value (and even direction) 
of the ultimate transfer obligations, and the unavoid-
able significance of counterparty credit risk in deriva-
tives transactions means that substantial performance 
(that is, credit) risk is an integral factor in the com-
pletion of derivatives transactions, compared with se-
curities or payments transactions.
Derivatives markets have evolved practices and 
institutional arrangements to deal with these special 
characteristics.8 These in turn have affected the devel-
opment and structure of derivatives markets. Today, 
broadly speaking, two parallel systems exist for clear-
ing and settling derivatives: bilateral clearing and 
settlement and central counterparty (CCP) clearing 
and settlement. Most OTC derivatives are settled bilat-
erally, that is, by the counterparties to each contract. 
Risk-management practices, such as collateralization, 
are also dealt with bilaterally by the counterparties to 
each contract.9
In contrast, most exchange-traded derivatives 
and some OTC derivatives are cleared and settled 
through a CCP. In the case of centrally cleared deriv-
atives markets, the original contract entered into by 
two counterparties is automatically replaced by two 
contracts, each of which arises between one of the 
original counterparties and the central counterparty. 24 4Q/2006, Economic Perspectives
Critical risk-management functions are typically car-
ried out by the clearinghouse. 
In the remainder of this article, we discuss a num-
ber of interrelated functions typically performed by 
derivatives clearing and settlement arrangements—
regardless of whether they are centralized (as in mar-
kets that utilize CCPs) or not—including:
n  Counterparty credit-risk-management techniques, 
such as netting, collateralization, procedures (such 
as DvP and PvP) to mitigate settlement risk, pro-
cedures (such as variation settlement) to mitigate 
replacement cost (or so-called forward) risk, and 
other risk-management mechanisms;
n   Market access restrictions, ongoing credit evalua-
tion, and monitoring;
n   Crisis management and user default administration;
n   Loss mutualization, insurance, and other measures 
that supplement the CCP’s risk-management mech-
anisms; and 
n   Related information collection and administrative 
functions necessary to the operation of the clearing 
and settlement arrangement.
We then consider how the clearing and settlement 
structure (for example, bilateral versus CCP) can af-
fect the functioning of markets. However, our compari-
son between bilateral and centrally cleared alternatives 
does not imply that one is a better model than the oth-
er. Bilateral and centrally cleared systems have coex-
isted for almost a century and are likely to continue to 
do so. This has occurred due to the heterogeneous na-
ture of derivatives products and their evolution. Each 
clearing method has its pros and cons, and these vary 
with the characteristics of the derivative being cleared.
Structure of central counterparties
A CCP can be defined as “... [a]n entity that inter-
poses itself between counterparties to contracts traded 
in one or more financial markets, becoming the buyer 
to every seller and the seller to every buyer.”10 In oth-
er words, a CCP becomes a substituted principal to 
BOX 1
Example of the functions required to clear and settle a derivative
Consider a ten-year interest rate swap with a notional 
value of $10 million and a fixed rate of 5 percent against 
a reference rate of six-month London Interbank Offer 
Rate (LIBOR), with semiannual payments in arrears. 
This contract calls for 20 semiannual payments to be 
computed at the beginning of each payment interval 
by taking the difference between the prevailing six-
month LIBOR and 5 percent and then multiplying that 
number by $10 million. This payment is then made at 
the end of the six-month interval, at which time the 
next period’s payment is also being determined. If the 
six-month LIBOR at the beginning of the period is 
greater than 5 percent, the payment is made by the 
“variable payer” to the “fixed payer” and vice versa.
Clearing and settling this swap involves all of 
the following:
n  Confirming the terms of the contract at its inception;
n  Determining the payment obligation at the begin-
ning of each six-month interval and notifying the 
parties; 
n  Settling payments due at the end of each six-month 
interval;
n   Maintaining the following records: terms of con-
tract, payments made/received by the counterpar-
ties, and names, addresses, and account numbers 
of the counterparties;1
n   Preparing reports needed for tax, financial, posi-
tion, risk-exposure reporting, and so on;
n   Valuing the swap for purposes of determining  
collateral requirements; 
n  Monitoring counterparty creditworthiness;
n   Determining collateral requirements (this usually 
involves all positions documented under a master 
agreement);
n  Valuation and monitoring of securities posted  
as collateral, and determination of “haircuts” to  
be applied to securities posted;2
n   Monitoring counterparties for compliance with  
the terms of the contract, in particular credit  
events defined under the contract;
n   Determining whether to exercise closeout rights 
when credit events occur; and
n  Pursuing legal remedies for recovering net amounts 
owed under closed out positions, or making net  
final payments owed and ensuring legal finality of 
closeout obligations.
1Even if the swap is not assigned to a new counterparty, this  
information can easily change over ten years.
2Haircuts are discounts applied to the market value of securities 
posted as collateral. Thus, a bond with a market value of $10 
million may only count as $9 million worth of collateral. Hair-
cuts protect the collateral holder against any fluctuation in the 
value of the collateral.25 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
contract obligations originating with other members 
of a financial market. Because it stands between mar-
ket buyers and sellers, the CCP bears no net market risk 
exposure—such risk remains with the original coun-
terparties to the trade. Credit risk, on the other hand, 
is centralized in the CCP itself. As a result, there is no 
need for the original counterparties to initially evaluate 
or continuously monitor each other’s creditworthiness. 
In fact, in a market that utilizes a CCP, the original par-
ties to a trade may be entirely unknown to each other.
The legal process whereby the CCP is interposed 
between buyer and seller is known as novation.11 No-
vation is the replacement of one contract with another 
or, in this case, one contract with two new contracts. 
The viability of novation depends on the legal enforce-
ability of the new contracts and the certainty that the 
original counterparties are not legally obligated to each 
other once the novation is completed. As a result of 
novation, the contract between the original counterpar-
ties is discharged and the CCP becomes the “buyer to 
every seller and the seller to every buyer.”
A CCP is legally obligated to perform on the con-
tracts to which it becomes a substituted counterparty 
in place of the original counterparties. However, be-
cause the CCP enters into two offsetting positions as 
a result of each novation, the CCP is “market neutral”—
the number of long positions will equal the number of 
short positions to which the CCP is a party, just as the 
number of long and short positions across the market 
as a whole cancel out. Thus, a CCP normally bears no 
market risk.12 But as counterparty to every position, 
the CCP bears credit risk in the event that one of its 
counterparties fails. Similarly, the CCP’s counterpar-
ties bear the credit risk that the CCP might fail.
CCPs mitigate their credit risk exposure through 
a number of reinforcing mechanisms, typically includ-
ing access restrictions, risk-management tools (such 
as collateralization), and loss mutualization. These 
mechanisms simultaneously serve to make market 
participants indifferent to the actual creditworthiness 
of the parties with which they trade on the centrally 
cleared market. They also have a number of ancillary 
effects that reduce costs to the CCP counterparties 
and increase liquidity in the market.
Access restrictions (such as membership require-
ments) are central structural components of the CCP 
arrangement. CCPs only deal with parties that meet 
the CCPs’ standards for creditworthiness and opera-
tional capability and may revoke access privileges for 
those who fail to maintain their creditworthiness and 
meet their other obligations to the CCPs. This permits 
the CCPs to limit their risk exposure to those parties 
they are able to monitor. 
In addition, CCPs typically impose some or all of 
the counterparty credit-risk-management techniques 
described above. For example, trading obligations 
(positions) and payment requirements are multilater-
ally netted, increasing operational efficiency and re-
ducing the amount at risk. CCPs also typically impose 
collateral requirements (sometimes known as initial 
margin) on those that have direct access to the CCP. 
Margining systems are designed to ensure that in the 
event that a clearing member fails to meet a margin 
call, sufficient funds remain readily available to close 
out the member’s positions without loss to the CCP 
in most market conditions. As a complementary risk-
management mechanism, the gains and losses from 
open positions are posted to a clearing member’s margin 
account on a regular (usually daily) basis and result 
in calls for variation settlement (or variation margin). 
The variation settlement reflects periodic mark-to-mar-
ket fluctuations and is an important mechanism for 
assuring the collateral held by the CCP is likely to be 
sufficient to meet the needs of the CCP in the event of 
a default. 
Another mechanism becomes operative if the 
posted collateral is not sufficient to offset a loss result-
ing from the failure of a counterparty. After exhaust-
ing the counterparty’s collateral, CCPs typically provide 
that any remaining loss will be shared among all (or 
certain classes of) clearing members. The details of 
such “loss mutualization” arrangements vary, but gen-
erally include a clearing or capital fund that is either 
paid in by clearing members or built up through accu-
mulated undistributed profits or transaction fee rebates.
The result of the credit standards and margining 
systems employed by CCPs and enforced on the mar-
ket is twofold. Firstly, credit risk is homogenized; and 
secondly, credit risk monitoring is delegated. Both of 
these effects tend to reduce the costs to market partic-
ipants. Credit risk is homogenized through standard-
ized margining and member capital requirements.  
In addition, the CCP’s risk-management mechanisms 
are supplemented by mutualization or loss sharing 
and other measures, such as third-party insurance. Since 
every clearing member’s counterparty is the CCP, it 
does not matter which member a market participant 
enters into a trade with. Informational costs and asym-
metries may also be reduced by having a central coun-
terparty. Instead of a market where participants must 
assess the creditworthiness of their counterparties in-
dividually and then act on that assessment, either 
through trading decisions or pricing, every clearing 
member is required to satisfy well-understood require-
ments. The CCP then monitors and enforces these re-
quirements, relieving the market participants of the 26 4Q/2006, Economic Perspectives
need to do so. Market participants need only have con-
fidence in the creditworthiness of the CCP, which may 
be ascertained in various ways, such as public ratings.
Because members are collectively liable for loss-
es, up to a predetermined level, and more importantly 
perhaps because they have a collective interest in the 
survival of the CCP, they have a strong incentive to 
work with and through the CCP to resolve issues. Since 
the CCP is the only direct counterparty of a clearing 
member, it effectively acts on behalf of the other, non-
defaulting clearing members in pursuing legal reme-
dies against any clearing member that defaults. In a 
bilaterally cleared market, each counterparty of a 
failed market participant would have to look out for 
its own interests, which, in principle, would signifi-
cantly raise legal and administrative costs.
Effects of CCP structure
Novation and the credit-risk-mitigation mecha-
nisms utilized by CCPs have a number of important 
effects on how centrally cleared derivatives markets 
function. The first and perhaps most important is that 
credit risk becomes homogenized, at least as far as 
clearing members are concerned. All clearing mem-
bers meet identical credit requirements and are sub-
ject to the same oversight. The homogenization of 
credit risk and the structure of mutualized loss shar-
ing facilitate anonymous trading among market par-
ticipants. This greatly reduces the informational costs 
of trading. Unlike bilaterally cleared markets—where 
assessments of counterparty credit risk influence the 
decisions of which counterparties will trade with which 
and which must post collateral and in what amount— 
in a centrally cleared market using a CCP, everyone is 
equal and the CCP ensures that obligations are met. 
Clearing derivatives through a CCP also facilitates 
liquidity in another way. Recall that a derivatives con-
tract is established between two particular parties. In 
the absence of a CCP, the contract could not easily be 
exited except by agreement of both parties (unlike a 
security that can simply be sold to a third party). En-
tering into an offsetting contract with a different coun-
terparty may eliminate the market risk of the combined 
positions, but credit risk remains. We’ll call the coun-
terparty to both contracts A and the other two coun-
terparties B and C. If B or C defaults, then A may be 
left with a loss on that position and an unhedged posi-
tion in the remaining contract. Furthermore, since A 
has two positions, it may need to hold collateral against 
both positions. Only by entering into an identical off-
setting contract with the original counterparty and then 
getting the counterparty to agree to cancel the offset-
ting positions (as is usually embodied in the relevant 
master agreements) can a market participant exit a 
position with legal certainty.  
The result is that positions tend to be left “on,” 
although they have become economically redundant. 
Furthermore, redundant positions can easily be built 
up across networks of participants. Redundant posi-
tions increase administrative burdens but, more im-
portantly, increase the number of positions that would 
need to be resolved were a member of the network to 
fail. The solution, multilateral netting, requires knowl-
edge and analysis of all the positions of all members 
in the network—however, the information needed to 
accomplish multilateral netting may include proprie-
tary information that the traders involved may not 
wish to share with outsiders. That concern may inhib-
it the cooperation and disclosure needed in the bilat-
eral markets to accomplish multilateral netting.
In a centrally cleared derivatives market with a 
CCP, the rules of the clearinghouse typically provide 
for the automatic netting and cancellation of offsetting 
contracts. Market participants can easily exit positions 
by entering into an offsetting trade with the CCP. The 
ability to easily enter into positions (which comes from 
credit risk homogenization and delegated monitoring) 
and the ability to easily exit positions (by having a 
single common counterparty) greatly increase the li-
quidity of the market. 
While liquidity is a great benefit of a CCP-cleared 
market, CCPs are themselves dependent upon a suffi-
cient level of liquidity to be of value to a particular 
market. Many OTC derivatives contracts are too spe-
cialized to develop the necessary volume to make 
central clearing feasible. However, as markets for 
particular contracts mature and as standardized forms 
of transacting and standardized contract terms are ad-
opted (as has happened in interest rates swaps, for in-
stance), CCP clearing of OTC derivatives becomes 
more and more feasible.
Alternatives to CCPs
In the previous section, we explained that CCPs 
bring a bundle of interrelated services to the market, 
including credit risk management, delegated monitor-
ing, and liquidity enhancement. However, a CCP is 
only one of a number of alternative structures that 
could be used to provide these services.13 Next, we 
consider how the OTC derivatives markets face the 
same issues addressed by these CCP services. 
As we discussed earlier, netting and position close-
out are natural outcomes of a CCP, so long as the le-
gal system recognizes novation (or the applicable 
legal mechanism for effecting counterparty substitu-
tion). Through the efforts of trade organizations, such 27 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
as the International Swaps and Derivatives Associa-
tion (ISDA), central banks, and others, legislatures 
have provided legal protection for netting and collat-
eral under covered master agreements for derivatives 
transactions. Thus, OTC derivatives market participants 
may enjoy netting and collateral benefits vis-à-vis a 
single counterparty similar to those enjoyed by CCP 
members with respect to their sole counterparty, the 
CCP. As noted above, there are practical constraints 
upon the ability of OTC market participants to multi-
laterally net their positions, payments, and other obli-
gations. However, these markets have developed other 
innovations to facilitate multilateral netting. An ex-
ample is TriOptima.14 Subscribers to TriOptima’s 
web-based service input their positions. TriOptima 
then runs algorithms to detect redundant positions 
and notifies subscribers of the early termination 
trades needed to eliminate redundancies. 
Organizations such as ISDA have also worked to 
reduce legal uncertainty through the use of standard-
ized contract language and terms. As a result, some 
types of OTC derivatives contracts have become stan-
dardized in all but their economic specifics. This in-
creases liquidity and reduces the costs of transacting. 
Likewise, the standardization of collateral arrangements 
reduces the costs of managing collateral. Moreover, 
recent movements to standardize the process for the 
assignment of contracts—that is, mutually agreed 
substitution of one counterparty with another—and 
greater market acceptance of assignments have the 
potential to enhance market liquidity.15
Mutualized loss sharing occurs in many forms in 
the economy. The most common mechanism is insur-
ance. Customers pay nonrefundable fees to the insur-
ance company, which in turn agrees to cover customers’ 
losses. Insurance, in the form of third-party guarantees, 
is routine in fixed income, securitization, and some 
derivatives markets. While insurance and performance 
guarantees rely on a single guarantor, rather than a 
pool of members, the business model effectively spreads 
the cost across the client base (or the company would 
not make a profit). Unlike mutualized loss sharing 
across a CCP’s member base, expected losses in an 
insurance arrangement are paid ex ante through pre-
miums, rather than being assessed ex post through at-
tachment of member funds and additional assessments. 
A CCP member only shares the losses after they have 
occurred and after the defaulting member’s funds have 
been exhausted. Meanwhile, the members may retain 
a legal interest in the funds from which losses are to 
be paid. Insurance customers, on the other hand, have 
no right to excess premiums they pay in and rely on 
market competition to keep these to an appropriate 
minimum. As with CCPs, the insurance company also 
centralizes risk assessment, pricing, mitigation, legal 
standing to pursue claims, collection and processing 
of payments, and so on.
Another function performed by CCPs is central-
ized bookkeeping. A similar function is performed in 
securities markets by securities depositories, which 
track beneficial ownership of securities, record changes 
in ownership, provide mailing lists for proxies and 
dividend payments, and so forth. These mundane func-
tions occur on such an enormous scale that centraliza-
tion provides overwhelming economies.16 Securities 
depositories are expanding their range of securities 
and the ancillary functions they perform. A recent pro-
posed innovation by the Depository Trust and Clear-
ing Corporation (DTCC) working with major dealers 
was to set up a database of “golden copies” of all credit 
derivatives in the U.S. This is to serve as the repository 
of the legally binding copy in the event of disagree-
ment. In the case of credit default swaps, the DTCC 
also assists in the determination of credit events by 
collecting information from individual counterparty 
actions and, when these reach a critical level for a 
particular underlying reference entity, informing the 
market. 
Conclusion
The CCP structure we know today is, to a certain 
extent, an artifact of the origins of exchange-traded 
contracts. At the same time, OTC markets have evolved 
other means of dealing with similar problems of cred-
it risk management and efficiency.
Today both CCP and bilaterally cleared market 
structures are evolving rapidly. Much of the attention 
has focused on CCPs, in part because they represent 
identifiable legal entities. The historical linkages be-
tween CCPs and specific exchanges have sometimes 
been viewed as important to the competitiveness of 
those exchanges and to the countries in which the CCPs 
and exchanges are located. Pressures to consolidate 
CCPs across exchanges, to free CCPs to clear OTC 
products, and to clear across borders continue to be 
controversial. Bilateral clearing is a market practice 
rather than a legally identifiable institution. Nonethe-
less, the sheer size of the dealers at the center of the 
OTC market, the relative opacity of the markets, and 
some operational problems have begun to draw atten-
tion to clearing in these markets as well.17
While CCP and bilaterally cleared markets deal 
with similar issues, they also have dissimilarities. OTC 
market products tend to be customized, to be less liq-
uid, and to involve less turnover of positions. In con-
trast, derivatives cleared through a CCP tend to be 28 4Q/2006, Economic Perspectives
highly standardized and highly liquid. While it is too 
strong to say that the two systems are converging, it 
is the case that both are evolving and in the process 
adapting ideas from each other: increasing scope and 
coverage on the part of CCPs and increasing efficien-
cies through standardization on the part of the OTC 
derivatives market.
An important public policy issue is whether and 
how to encourage these developments. In considering 
these questions it is important to distinguish the bene-
fits from the structures. Economies of scale can be 
achieved both by cross-border consolidation of CCPs 
and by cross-border consolidation of dealers. Credit 
risk management can be done by CCPs or by insurance 
companies. Operational efficiency can be obtained by 
centralizing processing in CCPs or in securities deposi-
tories. It is true that CCPs perform all these functions 
in a single institution. There may be some synergies 
to doing so, though this is not necessarily obvious.  
As the discussion proceeds, it is important to note that 
markets have generally been successful in evolving 
mechanisms for dealing with collective risks. Both 
CCPs and the structures and practices of bilateral 
clearing were, for the most part, developed by mar-
kets and not mandated by regulators. If the goal of 
policymakers is to create an environment in which 
market mechanisms can evolve to provide greater  
societal benefits while containing systemic risks, it 
may be useful to recognize the multiplicity of possi-
ble approaches to any given problem. The CCP, 
where it has the necessary market depth to function, 
may turn out to be the most attractive and efficient 
solution. But, then again, in some cases it may not.
1The Bond Market Association (www.bondmarkets.com).
2International Swaps and Derivatives Association (www.isda.org). 
The “notional value” of a financial contract is the principal amount 
involved in the transaction. For example, an option to buy 100  
barrels of oil at $65/barrel would have a notional value of $6,500. 
Derivatives contracts typically call for periodic payments over the 
life of the contract of amounts that may be based upon the princi-
pal amount, but not the principal itself. Thus, the parties’ credit ex-
posure is typically measured by the “replacement cost” of the 
contract, not the notional value. 
3According to the most recent semiannual survey of derivatives 
market statistics published by the Bank for International Settlements, 
the outstanding notional value of OTC derivatives contracts (includ-
ing both futures and options) was $284 trillion (Bank for International 
Settlements, 2006b, table 19). By comparison, exchange-traded de-
rivatives exceeded $83 trillion (Bank for International Settlements, 
2006a, table 23A). Data are for December 2005 and June 2006, 
respectively.
4See, inter alia, Bliss and Papathanassiou (2006), Bank for 
International Settlements (2001), Bank for International 
Settlements (1997), Bank for International Settlements (1998), 
Bank for International Settlements (2004), Counterparty Risk-
Management Policy Group II (2006), Kroszner (1999), Moser 
(1998), Moskow (2006), Murawski (2002), Ripatti (2004), and 
Russo, Hart, and Schönenberger (2002).
5See Moskow (2006).
6Settlement risk, sometimes referred to as “Herstatt risk,” is the 
risk that arises because of a temporal disjunction between two re-
lated payments or other financial transactions. It is not unique to 
foreign currency transactions, as it arises whenever two linked pay-
ments or financial transactions occur sequentially. The 1974 failure 
of Herstatt Bank has become the classic illustration of settlement 
risk. See, for example, Steigerwald (2001).
7In recent years, securities markets have begun to use mechanisms 
(such as central counterparties) to mitigate the counterparty credit 
risks associated with securities transactions prior to settlement. 
See, for example, Bank for International Settlements (2004). 
8See Moser (1998) and Kroszner (1999).
9In the late nineteenth century, a third arrangement existed on some 
futures exchanges known as ring clearing, but this evolved into 
central counterparty clearing. Ring clearing involved agreement by 
a group of market participants to treat each other’s contracts as 
more or less interchangeable, allowing transfer and termination of 
offsetting positions. The recent development and acceptance of 
standardized procedures to assign derivatives (substitute counter-
parties) and their use on a regular basis has some of the character-
istics of ring clearing. See Moser (1998) for history and details.
10Bank for International Settlements (2004).
11An alternative approach to establishing a central counterparty re-
lation, known as open offer, is used in some European countries. In 
this case, the CCP makes an offer to enter into pairs of contracts on 
terms agreed upon by two markets participants, under certain rules. 
The market participants agree upon the terms but never formally 
enter into a contract vis-à-vis each other. Instead, they report their 
agreement to the CCP, which then enters into the two contracts.
12Were a counterparty to default, the CCP’s position would become 
unbalanced and exposed to market risk until the CCP reverses out 
the defaulting member’s positions.
13See, for example, Hills et al. (1999), pp. 122–124. 
14See www.trioptima.com.
15The assignment of a contract, if legally effective, results in the 
substitution of a new counterparty for one of the original parties to 
a financial transaction.
16With the exception of securities derivatives and government 
bonds, most securities in the U.S. are processed through a single 
depository, the Depository Trust Corporation (DTC) and its affili-
ates, which provide a variety of risk-management functions.
17See Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group II (2005), 
Bliss and Kaufman (2006), and Bliss and Papathanassiou (2006).
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